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ABSTRACT
In public sector procurement, social welfare often depends on the time taken to complete the contract.
A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion times inflict a negative externality
on commuters. Recently, highway departments have introduced innovative contracting methods based
on scoring auctions that give contractors explicit time incentives. We characterize equilibrium bidding
and efficient design of these contracts. We then gather an extensive data set of highway repair projects
awarded by the California Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2008 that includes both
innovative and standard contracts. Comparing similar con- tracts in which the innovative design was
and was not used, we show that the welfare gains to commuters from quicker completion substantially
exceeded the increase in the winning bid. Having argued that the current policy is effective, we then
develop a structural econometric model that endogenizes participation and bidding to examine counterfactual
policies. Our estimates suggest that while the current policy raised com- muter surplus relative to the


















Public sector procurement accounts for approximately 15 percent of world output. Designing
ecient procurement mechanisms is therefore essential for guaranteeing the ecient alloca-
tion of many goods and services. In the United States, auctions are typically used to award
procurement contracts to the lowest qualied bidder. In many contexts, however, social wel-
fare depends upon the time to complete the contract. Unfortunately, standard procurement
mechanisms do not weight expected completion time in selecting the winning bidder. This
suggests that it may be possible to increase social welfare by including project completion
time in the auction design.
We take as a case study the design of time incentives in award procedures for highway
procurement. Highway repair makes for a good case study, as it generates signicant negative
externalities for commuters through increased gridlock and commuting times. For example,
US 101 is an important highway through Silicon Valley, carrying over 175,000 commuters per
day. If a highway construction project results in a 30-minute delay each way for commuters
on this route, the daily social cost imposed by the construction would be 175,000 hours. If
we value time at $10 an hour, this implies a social cost of $1.75 million per day. But in
standard highway contracts, contractors have poor incentives to internalize this externality.
For example, highway contractors in California are given relatively generous deadlines, and
even then are only penalized with damages of up to $40,000 per day late. Given these weak
incentives, it is likely that the observed completion times will be ineciently slow.
Recently, state highway departments in the US have started to experiment with innovative
contract designs that provide explicit time incentives. The most sophisticated is called A+B
bidding. Here contractors submit a dollar bid for labor and materials, the \A" part, and a
total number of days to complete the project, the \B" part. The bids are scored using both
the A and the B bid and the project is awarded to the contractor with the lowest score. The
winning contractor may also receive incentive payments (disincentives) for completing the
project earlier (later) than the days bid. Standard highway contracts are \A-only" contracts
because they do not weight project completion time in selecting the winning contractor.
In this paper, we evaluate this new contract design both theoretically and empirically. We
start by building a simple model of A+B contracts that includes standard A-only contracts
and other commonly used contract designs as special cases. We characterize equilibrium bids
and project completion times. Intuition suggests that the right policy is to \tax" contractors
1for each day they take, thereby forcing them to internalize the externality. We show that the
time weight in the A+B scoring rule acts like a tax, and so this contract design can achieve
ecient outcomes. By contrast, the standard contract design amounts to a \soft quota"
policy, and will generally result in an ineciently slow project completion time.
Armed with these insights, we move on to the heart of the paper: an analysis of over 1300
contracts awarded by the California Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2008.
Our data includes detailed information on the contract provisions and award procedures,
summaries of the bids and bidders, time taken during construction, and damages charged
for late completion. Examining the A+B bid data, we see that contractors on average bid
to complete the work much quicker than the plans require, around 60% of the engineer's
days estimate. From the payment data, we see that they almost always follow through
and complete on time, whether the target is one they bid on themselves (A+B), or one
given by the design engineer (standard). So by multiplying a project-specic estimate of the
daily social cost to commuters by the days saved by accelerating the target date, we get an
average reduction in the negative externality to commuters of $6.4M per contract. Using a
reasonably detailed understanding of the A+B assignment rule, we then construct a control
group of standard contracts for the A+B contracts, and compare their winning bids using
both regression and matching estimators. The winning bid is on average $1.5M higher in
A+B contracts, so the policy raises commuter welfare by substantially more than the change
in procurement costs.
Next, we estimate the additional costs accrued by contractors when accelerating construction.
The theory implies that bidders equate the weight on days in the scoring rule with their
marginal costs of acceleration. By manipulating this rst order condition and making a
parametric assumption about the form of the acceleration costs, we can back out the shape
of the cost curve. Taking advantage of policy variation in the way the weights are assigned
across districts, we estimate this curve and nd that it is sharply convex. This implies that
small reductions in completion time are reasonably cheap, but large reductions are expensive
and require far bigger incentives. So a relatively cost eective policy for Caltrans would be
to award more contracts by A+B auction than is current practice, but give weaker time
incentives.
To test this theory, we estimate auxiliary models of contractor participation and win proba-
bility, and use these models together to examine counterfactual scenarios. We nd that the
fully ecient policy raises commuter welfare relative to contractor costs by a large amount,
2nearly 29% of the total contract value (for these contracts, $1.5B). Moreover, since accelera-
tion costs to contractors are passed through to Caltrans, which may face budget constraints,
we show that a policy with smaller time incentives could achieve most of these gains ($1.2B)
without higher total acceleration costs than under the current policy. This motivates our
main conclusion, which is that including stronger time incentives in highway procurement
through more sophisticated contract design would substantially raise commuter surplus rel-
ative to contractor costs.
This paper is related to four main literatures. There is a literature in engineering on the
role of time incentives in highway procurement (see for example Arditi, Khisty and Yasamis
(1997) and Herbsman, Chen and Epstein (1995)), as well as a recent report from the National
Cooperative Highway Research Program (Fick, Cackler, Trost and Vanzler 2010). These
papers take more of a descriptive approach than we do here.
The second is the large theoretical literature on regulation and optimal procurement (see for
example Weitzman (1974), Laont and Tirole (1987), Manelli and Vincent (1995), Branco
(1997)). In analyzing A+B auctions, we follow the existing literature on scoring auctions
starting with Che (1993) and extended in Asker and Cantillon (2008b). We focus on welfare-
maximizing, rather than cost-minimizing contract design, thereby avoiding complex multi-
dimensional screening issues (see Asker and Cantillon (2008a) for an analysis of optimal
scoring auctions).
Third, there is a growing empirical literature on auctions with multidimensional attributes.
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2005) and Marion (2007) consider outcomes from mechanisms
where the contract is not awarded solely based on price. Athey and Levin (2001) and Ba-
jari, Houghton and Tadelis (2007) analyze multidimensional bidding in timber auctions and
highway procurement respectively, emphasizing how the bids determine ex-post behavior.
Finally, our paper is related to earlier work on analysis of highway contracts (see Porter
and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-Benet and Pesendor-
fer (2003), Krasnokutskaya (2004),Li and Zheng (2006), Marion (2007), De Silva, Dunne,
Kankanamge and Kosmopoulou (2008), Einav and Esponda (2008), Gil and Marion (2009)
and Lewis and Bajari (2010)).
Section 2 presents an overview of the highway procurement process. Sections 3, 4 and 5
respectively contain the theoretical, empirical and counterfactual policy analysis. Section 6
concludes. All proofs and tables are in the appendix.
32 Highway Procurement in California
Highway procurement in California takes place in three phases, as illustrated by Figure 1.
Once a need for construction has been identied, Caltrans designs the project: a set of plans
embodies this design. The design engineer will also develop an estimate of the project cost
(\the engineer's estimate) and a target number of working days for project completion (\the
engineer's days estimate"). Based on advice from the trac operations unit, the design
will specify a maximum number of lanes that can be closed at each phase of the project,
and during which hours of the day closures may occur. Last, the engineer will make a
recommendation as to whether a standard or A+B contract design should be used, usually
based on the size of the project and the projected negative externality (given the lane closure
schedule). This recommendation goes for approval to headquarters.
Once a decision has been made, the terms of the contract are summarized in a set of special
provisions. In a standard design, the provisions specify that the contract will be awarded to
the lowest responsive bidder, and the winning rm will have to complete the contract within
the engineer's days estimate. In the A+B design, the contract is awarded based on a scoring
rule, and the winning rm must complete the contract within the number of days they bid.
At this point the project is advertised, and interested parties can obtain copies of the plans
and special provisions. In California, bidders are pre-qualied by having a contractor license
for that kind of work, and by submitting a bond equal to 10% of their bid. This bond will
be forfeited if they win the contract and then don't complete it (alternately the bond issuer,
typically a third party, may pay someone else to complete the work). Next, the contractors
bid on the contract, according to the bidding rules laid out in the special provisions. In
the case of A+B contracts, if the days bid seems unrealistic, the winning contractor may be
required to provide a convincing project timeline for on-time completion, otherwise Caltrans
may seek to disqualify their bid.1
Once the contract is awarded, the construction phase starts. The contractor must plan
how to structure the various distinct activities, such as excavation or grading, that make
up the construction project, operating within the constraints of the lane closure schedule.
They determine how long each activity will take for a standard crew size, and then apply
the \critical path method" (Clough, Sears and Sears 2005) to devise the optimal sequence
to complete the activities in. The key feature of this technique is that some activities are
















Figure 1: Timing of Events in Highway Procurement Process
designated as critical, and must be completed on time to avoid delay, while others are o
the critical path and have some time slack. If the derived plan allows for timely completion
plus some contingency time (usually 5%) then it is used; otherwise the contractor will have
to change the planned inputs and iterate. For A+B contracts, the construction plan may
have to be worked out before bidding.
Next, the construction begins. During the process, the project engineer conducts random
checks on the quality of the materials and monitors whether everything is completed accord-
ing to the plan specications. He also designates days on which environmental conditions
make work dicult as \weather days", and as \other days" those on which the contractor
cannot work through no fault of his own (e.g. a general strike). These days do not count
towards the contract deadline. Still, productivity shocks may aect the rate at which any
activity is completed, and contractors check progress against the planned time path and
amend plans if necessary. At the end of the process, the contractor is paid the amount bid
less any damages assessed for late completion. The daily damages are equal to the usercost







+ RE Oce Expenses (1)
The LD% depends on the type and size of contract, and ranges from 10% to 20%. The home
oce expenses are estimates of oce rental and related costs for the resident engineer.
3 Theory
Before turning to the data, it will be useful to specify a simple model to frame the empirical
analysis. Essentially, the problem faced by Caltrans is twofold: On the one hand, they
2The engineer's days term excludes days on which planting is done on the highway (\plant establishment
days"). A new formula was adopted in 2009, outside of our sample period.
5want to award highway contracts to the most cost eective or ecient bidder. For this, an
auction mechanism is the preferred approach. On the other hand, they want to regulate an
externality | the delay to commuters caused by highway construction | when they don't
know how expensive it is for contractors to accelerate construction. If the available policy
tools were either a quota or a tax on the time to completion, this would correspond to the
problem analyzed in Weitzman (1974).
In practice, these two problems are solved jointly by rst specifying a set of time incentives
as part of the contract, and then awarding that contract, typically by auction. We refer to
the combination of time incentives plus award mechanism as a contract design. To analyze
the theoretical performance of the A+B and standard contract designs, we now set up a
model of an A+B auction that subsumes the standard design as a special case:
Auction Format: n risk-neutral contractors bid on a highway procurement contract. A
bid is a pair (b;dB) indicating the base payment b received by the winning contractor, and
the contract days dB 2 [0;dE]. The upper bound dE is the project engineer's estimate of the
maximum time the project should take to complete. The bids are ranked according to the
scoring rule s = s(b;dB) = b+cUdB, and the contract is awarded to the contractor with the
lowest score. The constant cU  0 in the scoring rule is known as the user cost. The contract
also species ex-post time incentives: a per day incentive cI  0 and disincentive cD > 0
that are applied when the winning contractor completes the job before or after the contract
days. We restrict our analysis to the case cI  cD, which holds for all of the contracts we
examine. The three parameters (cU;cI;cD) dene the incentive structure.
Payos and Types: Losing bidders receive a payo normalized to zero. The winning
contractor has a payo given by:
(b;d
B;d










where dT is the actual days taken to complete the contract and c(dT;) are the costs incurred.
Prot is bid plus incentive payments (possibly negative) less costs.
The cost function c(dT;) is \long-run", in the sense that it represents the cost of completing
the contract in dT days, for a contractor of type , given optimal input choices.3 We assume
a textbook long-run cost curve, U-shaped in d for all , with a minimum at the ecient scale
3Once construction starts and inputs are hired, the contractor will face a \short-run" cost function
c(d;;K) for xed inputs K = K(d;), but this is not the relevant curve at the bidding stage.
6of construction (which is presumably close to the engineer's estimate). Contract acceleration
is costly because it requires working at an ineciently large scale. Formally, the function
is assumed twice continuously dierentiable and strictly convex in d for all . The type
 reects contractor-specic cost parameters, such as their expertise with working on a
tight schedule, their relationships with subcontractors and input suppliers, and their current
managerial capacity.4. We assume that each contractor i draws their cost parameter i from
some contractor-specic distribution Fi with common compact support   Rk for all i.
This is an (asymmetric) independent private values (IPV) framework.
Strategies and Equilibrium: A (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium of the game comprises a set
of bidding strategies (1(); ;n()) of the form i() = (bi();dB
i ()), that are mutual
best-responses; and a completion time dT(dB;).
Social Welfare and Eciency: Social welfare is given by W(dT;) = V  c(dT;) dTcS.
It reects the total social value of the highway project V , less the contractor's private costs,
less the social costs imposed on motorists by the construction. The social costs are assumed
to be linear in the days taken, with the daily social cost equal to a constant cS.
We say that a contract design is ex-post ecient if the incentive structure is such that
the completion time dT(dB;) is welfare maximizing for all types . We say that a contract
design is ex-ante ecient if the winning bidder is always the bidder who generates the highest
social welfare W(dT;) in equilibrium. These notions decouple regulating the winning bidder
(ex-post eciency) from choosing that bidder (ex-ante eciency).
Standard Contracts: The standard contract design is a special case.5 The contract is
awarded solely on the bid amount, and the design engineer sets dE. There are no positive
incentives (cI = 0), and the disincentives cD are called liquidated damages, determined by
the formula (1). This corresponds to our model with the constraint that bidders bid dB = dE.
We proceed in two parts. First we analyze how eective the two designs are in regulating
the externality, and then we look at whether the auction mechanism is ex-ante ecient.
Ecient Regulation: The standard contract design is ex-post inecient. To see this,
4For example, the construction company C.C. Myers repaired an important ramp between I80 and I580
near San Francisco after an explosion, doing so in 17 days as opposed to the 50 estimated. In an interview,
the owner mentioned as important factors for the speedy completion a collaboration with a steel fabricator
to get girders made quickly, an ambitious plan that allowed for work to be done while still waiting for some
of the inputs, and his crews working all day in 12-hour shifts (Pogash 2007).
5We omit analysis of two other important contract designs with time incentives: lane rental and incen-


















Figure 2: Completion Time in Standard and A+B Contracts. Both panels show the
marginal private cost of acceleration curve(s),  c0(d;). The left panel shows a standard contract,
with damages charged after the specied completion time dE. The optimal completion times vary
with the type , but all types choose to complete at dE, which is inecient. In the right panel, the
contractor bids to complete where the usercost intersects his acceleration cost curve, and completes
on time because of the incentive structure. If the usercost equals the social cost, this is ecient.
consider the left panel of Figure 2. The downward-sloping curves are three possible marginal
private cost of acceleration curves, corresponding to three dierent types for the winning
contractor. As depicted, all types have positive costs of acceleration at the engineer's days
estimate, and all would prefer to operate at a lower scale and complete more slowly. But they
are penalized at a rate of cD when late, giving them an incentive for on-time completion. By
contrast, there is no bonus for being early, which implies the time incentives are discontinuous
at dE. This design eectively amounts to a quota of dE days, where the penalty for exceeding
the quota is cD. Facing these incentives, all three types will complete exactly on time. But
since eciency requires that dierent types complete at dierent times to equate their private
marginal costs and benets of acceleration, this design is inecient.
Instead, the contractor should be forced to internalize the externality imposed on commuters
by construction. The simplest way to do this is a tax of cS per day. As it turns out, the
A+B design looks like a quota, but behaves like a tax. Look at the right panel of Figure 2.
There, cI < cD so that the contractor faces discontinuous incentives at dB, like a quota. But
the contractor can choose dB in the auction. The scoring rule species the trade-o: each
extra day bid forces the contractor to lower their bid by cU to maintain the same score. This
essentially amounts to a tax on each day of cU. Not surprisingly then, if the usercost is set
equal to the social cost cS, this creates the right incentives for ex-post eciency.
The only complication is that the contractor is not bound by the days bid, except insofar
8as the contract enforces compliance. Whenever cD < cU, the eective tax is only cD, and
so the contractor will bid zero days but complete where the marginal cost of acceleration
equals cD.6 This design detail is important in practice: in some of the rst A+B contracts
they let, Caltrans set cD < cU, and the contractors bid just one day. As a consequence, in
all the recent contracts they have issued, Caltrans has set cI < cU = cD. Overall, for ex-post
eciency in the A+B design, it is sucient that the eective cost of delay is cS, which is
best accomplished by setting cU = cS and cI  cU  cD.
Ex-Ante Eciency: The next question is whether the auction mechanism awards the
contract to the contractor who will maximize social welfare. As Asker and Cantillon (2008b)
show, in a scoring auction the equilibrium strategies of bidders are functions of their pseudo-






where dB and dT are optimally chosen in the manner described above, and IP(dT;dB)
denotes any incentive payments that will be paid or charged. The pseudo-cost has three
parts: contractor costs given the construction plan; the incentive payments received under
that plan; and the B-score cUdB. This one-dimensional pseudo-cost is a sucient statistic
for the bidder's type .
Having transformed the types into pseudo-costs, we can then apply standard results from
the auction literature. Provided the bidders are symmetric, the auction mechanism will
award the contract to the bidder with the lowest pseudo cost. Now, if the contract is ex-post
ecient, the pseudo-cost is equal to the social cost of the project, and so awarding it on
the basis of pseudo-cost yields ex-ante eciency. More generally, even when the contract
design is not ex-post ecient, it may still be best to award based on pseudo-cost. This is
true of standard contracts if incentives are appropriately set. Suppose, for example ,that all
bidders have positive benets of delay up until the engineer's target date. Then since there
are no bonuses for being early, all contractors will complete either on-time or late. By setting
cD = cS, the procurer can force contractors to internalize the social costs of late completion
as part of their pseudo-cost. Then awarding the contract on the basis of pseudo-cost selects
the contractor who maximizes welfare subject to the constraint that they cannot nish early
| a second best result | and this is ex-ante ecient.
In summary, the problem of regulating the externality and awarding the contract can be
6Bidding to complete one day earlier than actually planned earns cU from the scoring rule, and costs cD
in damages, so is always desirable with those incentives, which implies a corner solution of zero days.
9largely decoupled. By taxing the externality through a weight in the scoring rule, the contract
design is made ex-post ecient. By awarding the contract by auction, we achieve the usual
gains from competition among bidders.
Cost of time incentives: Later in the paper, we consider how much the use of A+B rather
than standard contracts costs Caltrans in practice. It would be nice to have a theoretical
prediction to take to the data. Our intuition is that it should be quite costly, as high powered
time incentives provide incentives for contract acceleration, and the acceleration costs should
be passed through in the form of higher bids. But without knowing more about the specics
of the pseudo-cost distribution, the pass through rate could be anything from below zero to

















where hj(s) is the hazard function of the distribution of scores submitted by bidder j. Under
the assumption that cI < cU < cD, contractors will nish on time, and IP(dT;dB) = 0. So
consider a switch from a standard to an A+B contract design. If type  optimally bids and
completes at dT given the usercost cU, they will experience a cost increase of c(dT;) c(dE;),
known to be positive. But the markup term in (4) depends on the full distribution of rival
cost functions via their scores, and may go up or down. For example, suppose there were
two companies: one that used cheap unskilled labor that could complete the job at a slow
rate, but could not cheaply accelerate; and another using more expensive skilled labor, that
was good at acceleration. The rst company might be able to maintain a high markup
in auctions for standard contracts, due to the cost asymmetry, but in the A+B contracts
that cost advantage would diminish and its markup would fall. On the other hand if the
same company were both cheap and quick, the A+B design would magnify their competitive
advantage, and their markup would rise. The conclusion is that the relationship between
costs and bids is complex, and it would be unwise to deduce cost changes from bid changes.
Discussion: The model is simple and gives clean intuition, but it abstracts away from
some real-world features. First, we assume that contractors choose their target completion
time at the time of bidding, and then everything follows according to plan (so that target
and actual dates coincide). We also assume that contractors are risk neutral. But events
may arise during construction which require adaptation of the construction plans, or cause
10unavoidable delays.7 This creates risk.
Contractor risk aversion would explain why Caltrans makes provision for delays that are
not the contractor's fault by counting them as weather or other days. It would also explain
why contractors build contingency time into their construction plans. Relative to the above
model, contractors may choose to operate at a slightly higher scale to \insure" against being
late due to an unexpected event. Risk aversion also matters for the bidding. Bigger time
incentives lead to greater variation in nal payments for the same target date, and though
this risk can be partially oset by \insuring" though bigger scale, the bids should pass
through not only the increased acceleration costs and markup but also a risk premium. But
the main intuition about contract design in terms of taxes and quotas will survive in the
more complex model: though the contractor problem is more complex, as long as he is made
to internalize the externality, the design will be ecient.
Second, we assume that the project engineer can successfully monitor the construction and
ensure that the nished project meets the contract specications. In this he is aided by
the mandatory bonding requirements, which limit incentives to shirk on quality. We do not
model the monitoring costs as part of the welfare function, as these costs are typically very
small. Finally, we do not model the restrictions on lane closure that are typically part of
the contract design: these are taken as exogenous. The social cost cS should therefore be
interpreted as the daily externality when these restrictions are enforced.
4 Empirical Analysis
The theory suggests how contracts should be designed in order to maximize social welfare.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine the A+B contract design in practice, using data
from contracts let by Caltrans during the period 2003-2008. Our dataset is rich, including
detailed data on the contract provisions, bids and outcomes for both standard and A+B
contracts. This enables us to answer two practical questions: Do A+B contracts work well
in practice? And could Caltrans adopt better policies? We answer the rst using the language
and methodology of the policy evaluation literature. For the second we build, estimate and
simulate counterfactual outcomes using a structural model of contractor behavior.
7In Lewis and Bajari (2010) we consider a richer model which includes a construction phase after the
bidding in which ex-ante unknown state variables are realized.
114.1 Data
To construct our dataset, we downloaded publicly available les from Caltrans. There are
three main kinds of data: special provisions, bid summary and nal payments. Special
provisions data were collected for all non-emergency contracts let in the sample period.8
The special provisions detail the amendments to the standard construction contract terms,
and are usually a pdf le of approximately 200 pages. From these les we extracted the
provisions relating to time and liquidated damages by text parsing. These allowed us to
classify the contracts as either A+B contracts, standard contracts, or some other type. A
dierent section described the lane closure restrictions. Since these are depicted in graphical
form, we had to hand-code this data, which we did for all A+B-eligible contracts (see below
for the denition of \eligible"), and for a stratied random sample of 10% of the remaining
standard contracts. We imputed the data for the remaining contracts.9 From this data we
constructed two variables. The rst is \lane closure ratio" which is the ratio of the number
of lanes the contractor may close (averaged across hours of the day) to the total lanes of the
highway. The second is \reopening penalty", a dummy for whether an explicit monetary
penalty is specied in the contract for late lane reopening.10
Bid summary data includes the location and description of each project, the design engineer's
estimate of the project cost, the required project duration, and bidder names, addresses and
bids.11 It also includes the funding source, so we can classify a project as federal or not. We
use this to construct a measure of the straight-line distance between the contractor's address
and the project location. Last, we collected nal payment data, which includes all payments
made by Caltrans to the winning contractor during the life of a project.12 This data only
encompasses projects completed during the sample period. The nal payment les also give
a breakdown of the working days, weather days, other days and contract change order days
over the course of the project, as well as the contract start and end date.13
We augmented this data with data on trac volumes and the percentage of trucks at each
8Data available here: http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/oe/project ads addenda/
9The imputed data is used only in the counterfactual simulations.
10For example, if all lanes should be open by 8am, and the contractor is still working at 8:15, the contractor
will be charged a signicant penalty, on average $4,000 per 15 minutes. In contracts without such a penalty,
the PE can suspend the contract instead.
11Data available at: http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/oe/planholders/bidsum.php
12Data available at: http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/asc/oap/payments/public/ctnums.htm
13Contract change order days are additional days allowed when the project design is amended during the
course of the project by means of a change order.
12of the locations.14 This enabled us to construct a simple measure of the negative externality
to commuters during project construction. Our formula for the social cost is:
Social Costt = Delayt  Time Valuet  Tract (5)
For time value, we use a weighted average of a value for cars ($12 per vehicle) and for trucks
($28 per vehicle). These are the values used by Caltrans in their own calculations in 2008.
To estimate the delay, we assume that trac will be slowed from 55MPH (the speed limit
on a typical California freeway) to 35MPH over the full length of the construction zone,
or ve miles, whichever is shorter. In most construction zones, a slowdown of at least this
magnitude is to be expected either due to actual lane closures or to trac control. These
assumptions are chosen to be conservative, and imply that we will never project a delay of
more than 3:11 minutes per commuter on any project.15 The social cost is then arrived at
by multiplying the trac, delay and average time value.
The Caltrans trac operations divisions in each district also calculate social costs, for the
purposes of deciding on A+B assignment and to set the user cost in the A+B scoring rule.
As far as we can tell, the methodology varies across districts and individual employees, and
consequently takes into account dierent possible sources of delay.16 The most sophisticated
calculations go beyond the direct delays we consider, also allowing for increased vehicle
operating costs (due to delays) and for queuing. Indeed, queues can often lead to massive
social costs and so the lane closure restrictions are often designed precisely to ensure that
lane closures occur only at times of day when they are not likely to result in a queue.
From the raw data we removed contracts where either the special provisions or bid summaries
were missing; contracts which were neither standard nor A+B contracts; and bids with highly
implausible ratios of bid to engineer's estimate (less than 20% or over 300%). We also chose
to focus on a subset of contracts which seemed a priori to potentially require lane or shoulder
closure: barrier construction, bridge repair or resurfacing, new lane or ramp construction,
road rehabilitation and widening/realignment.17. The A+B design is very rarely used outside
14We used the 2008 measures at: http://trac-counts.dot.ca.gov/index.htm
15We also used Google Maps to calculate a detour route for a typical commuter around the construction
zone, but in all cases the detour caused a delay of more than 3.11 minutes and so this data was discarded.
16We have seen three quite dierent calculations: one similar to ours, initially developed by headquarters
in 2004; the more sophisticated spreadsheet described in the main text, developed by district 10 in 2007; and
an actual calculation for a contract in district 12, which is based on assessing the delay due to a temporary
reduction in roadway capacity.
17Omitted categories: cleaning, drainage, plant establishment, retrotting, sealing, signs and slope recon-
13of these categories. Likewise, we restricted the analysis to those Caltrans districts that use
the A+B design with some frequency (they are SF Bay Area (4), Fresno (6), Riverside/San
Bernadino (8), San Diego (11) and Orange County (12)). Of these, district 4 is by far the
most frequent user of the format, and plays an important role in our analysis.
4.2 Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 summarizes many of the contract characteristics. Data from our chosen districts
comprises 603 standard and 79 A+B contracts, which we compare in the rst two columns.
A+B contracts are typically much bigger, in terms of both cost and time required, have
higher trac counts and higher estimated social costs. We also see that A+B contracts are
much more likely that to include an explicit monetary penalty for late lane re-opening. The
standard contracts in the omitted districts are typically smaller in both size and potential
welfare loss, and less than 1% of them are A+B.18
Finally, our social cost estimates are on average much higher than the usercosts for the A+B
contracts. This is a little surprising, as Caltrans policy is to set the usercost equal to their
calculated social cost estimate, and our social cost estimates should be more conservative
than theirs. We are not sure how to account for the dierence: it could be that Caltrans
assumes no negative externality during hours when lane closures are not permitted (though
we have been told this is not the case), or that sometimes they set the usercost below
their social cost estimate to avoid having the B-score be \too large" relative to the contract
size.19. Given how conservative our calculations have been, however, we will proceed under
the assumption that they are a lower bound on the true social costs.
The dierences in characteristics between standard and A+B contracts suggests non-random
assignment. To learn about the assignment mechanism, we asked the ocials in a number of
districts how they decided on the A+B contracts. All of the districts except district 4 said
they followed a rule mandated by headquarters, under which a project should be assigned
A+B status if the engineer's estimate was over $5M and it had an estimated daily social
cost of over $5,000. District 4, on the other hand, indicated they used the A+B design
struction/protection.
18The LA district is unusual in that contracts are big and lane closures cause large delays, but the A+B
design is not used. Instead incentive/disincentive designs are used on time sensitive segments of projects.
19Some Caltrans engineers expressed concern that large time incentives would push the contractors to
genuinely accelerate construction, rather than just trim excess fat from their construction schedules.
14whenever the engineer's days estimated exceeded 100 days. In all districts, there was room
for exceptions, for example to use the design when there were other political / economic issues
that made timely completion important, and to disqualify the design when the contract had
the potential for third party problems.20
To test this in the data, we rst constructed a set of size eligible contracts, consisting of those
that were either over $5M (outside of district 4) or over 100 days (in district 4). We then
estimated a probit for A+B assignment, using a small set of RHS covariates. The results
are shown in Table 2, split out for district 4, other districts and combined. Looking at the
combined column, we see that the average marginal eect on trac is highly signicant and
large: an additional 10,000 trac increases the probability of A+B assignment by approxi-
mately 1.4%. District 4 is also far more likely to assign the A+B design for a given contract
size (consistent with the fact that it has no social cost threshold), and similarly bridge resur-
facing contracts are more likely to be A+B, though this is only signicant at 10%.21 Using
a simple rule that predicts A+B assignment only for eligible contracts with predicted A+B
probabilities over 50%, we can correctly predict nearly 92% of the assignments. The fact
that we can do so well with a very simple model and ve covariates suggests that the districts
acted largely in accordance with their policies.
Similarly, we wanted to understand how the usercosts were chosen for the A+B contracts.
Again, most districts set the usercost equal to the estimated social cost, as suggested by
headquarters. But district 4 says they typically set the usercost using the liquidated damage
formula of equation (1), rather than basing it on a social cost calculation. Table 3 shows
the results of a regression of log usercost on covariates, where the log specication is chosen
because of the ratio form of the liquidated damage formula. For district 4, we can explain 80%
of the variation, again suggesting that their description is accurate. We are less successful for
the other districts (R2 of 0.42), but this is probably not surprising given the limited amount
of data and the variation in methodology for calculating social costs across districts.
20Third party problems arise, for example, when a utility company needs to evacuate a piece of land during
some phase of the construction. Then if the company is late in fullling its obligations, the contractor cannot
proceed and can claim compensation from Caltrans for the delay. This is presumably more problematic when
the contractor is on a tight schedule.
21We have tried additional controls for other kinds of work, but none of them are signicant.
154.3 Policy Evaluation
We now turn to the question of whether the A+B design works well in practice. To best
take advantage of our data, we proceed in two parts. First, we ask whether the A+B
design accelerates project delivery at reasonable cost assuming that bidders fulll the contract
terms. This part of the analysis uses all the data. Then we look to see whether in fact ex-post
behavior by contractors diers across A+B and standard contracts in terms of actual delivery,
contract violations etc. This second part uses only the data from completed contracts.
Does the A+B design incentivize bidders to commit to nish the project faster? Recall
that under the standard design, the project deadline is set by the design engineer; whereas
in A+B the bidders may commit to any time faster than that. So a sensible measure of
acceleration is the ratio of the winning days bid to the engineer's days estimate. In the A+B
contracts the average ratio is 59.5%!22 To put this into dollar terms, we calculate a welfare
gain to commuters as the days accelerated (engineer's estimate less winning bid) times the
daily social cost estimate. This comes out to an average of $6.46M per contract.23
We know already that the A+B contracts are a selected sample of the full set of contracts,
and so it would be inappropriate to make inferences for the whole sample based on these
outcomes. Viewed through the lens of the treatment eects literature, what we see is an
average treatment eect on the treated (ATT). The A+B \treatment" caused an acceleration
of around 40% in the target completion time for these contracts.24 What we would like to
know is what this costs Caltrans.
To answer this question, we need a consistent estimate of how much the winning bid on
each A+B contract would have been had it been a standard contract. We construct a
control group consisting of all eligible standard contracts. Since we don't have good control
contracts for bridge resurfacing (almost all of them are A+B), and sparse data above the
95th percentile of contract size ($90M +) we omit these from the subsequent analysis. In
Table 4 we show that this control group is well balanced relative to the A+B group on
most observables (including types of work). The statistically signicant dierences relate to
22The median is very similar, 60.0%, so this is not driven by a few outliers.
23We assume throughout that commuters are not delayed on days where no construction occurs, such as
weekends, weather and other days. If delays also occur on these non-working days, our estimates of the
welfare gain will be too low by a factor of between 1.6 and 1.8, since each working day attracts between 0.6
and 0.8 non-working days (depending on contract size).
24The causal language is appropriate here since we are talking about commitments, not outcomes: in the
absence of the treatment, the commitment would have been to complete in the engineer's days.
16trac, lane closures and re-opening penalties, which we will control for in what follows.
We can now look at whether these A+B contracts cost more than they would have had
they been standard contracts. We estimate this counterfactual cost in two ways. First, we
run an OLS regression of the log winning bid on a variety of covariates, including A+B
status, for the subsample consisting only of the treatment and control groups.25 A log-linear
specication seems appropriate since one would expect errors to scale with contract size. We
control for contract size, trac, lane closures and re-opening penalties, type of work, year
and district. All these control variables are pre-determined at the time of A+B assignment.
The regression results are shown in Table 5. In all columns, we see a signicant positive
coecient on the A+B dummy, implying that these contracts cost 7-11% more than if the
design had been standard.26 The coecient increases as we add xed eects and additional
controls. Notice also that trac and lane closures do not enter signicantly, which is re-
assuring as it suggests that the factors important for assignment may be orthogonal to the
contractor's costs. The t is very good, as seen from the high R2 terms. This is because the
engineer's estimate is a superb control for contract costs.
Our second approach is a non-parametric matching estimator. We match each A+B contract
to the standard contract that is closest on the observables, and compare the winning bids.27
We try to force exact matches on the categorical variables district, type of work and year
where possible and then within those cells to match on all the covariates from columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5. We are able to exactly match 66% of the time. Averaging the dierences
in bids, we get a sample estimate of the average eect on the treated (ATT).
To facilitate direct comparison, we also convert the percentage costs from the OLS regressions
into an average dollar eect, and summarize all the results in Table 6. The OLS estimates
indicate an increase in the winning bid of between $1.23M and $1.77M (our preferred speci-
cation). The matching estimator yields an increase of between $1.63M and $2.13M, albeit
with much higher standard errors. Combined with the commuter welfare estimate from ear-
lier, we estimate that the dierence between the gain to commuters and the higher payments
by Caltrans is between $4.8M and $5.8M per contract. This compares favorably with the
25We don't use the full sample because of the well-known problems with enforcing linearity over parts of
the covariate space in which there is no overlap of treatment and control | running the full sample regression
leads to the odd result that A+B contracts do not cost more.
26Strong, Tometich and Raadt (2005) nd a similar cost increase of 7.5% for A+B contracts in Minnesota.
27We also perform the linear bias-correction of Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2001) since even small
dierences in average contract size across the treatment and control might otherwise bias the results.
17average A+B contract size of $23M. Although this is not a social welfare measure | since
additional contractor costs are unobserved, and bid changes may be a poor proxy for reasons
discussed earlier | it still suggests that the policy provided considerable value to taxpayers.
Discussion: We conclude this subsection with some comments regarding the interpretation
of the results. First, this is an estimated eect on the treated: these contracts were selected
by Caltrans on the basis of being time sensitive projects, and we wouldn't expect a $5M
welfare gain for a random highway contract (as we will see in the structural results). Second,
these results could be biased by selection on unobservables. This seems less of a concern
than it might be in other settings since we have a good understanding of what drives A+B
assignment and can argue that the omitted factors have limited impact. For example, third
party issues are often cited as a reason that an eligible contract was not assigned A+B status,
and we do not control for them in the evaluation. But as long as the third party issues don't
impact contractor costs when operating on a standard schedule | and they shouldn't, by
design | they will not bias the results. In addition, we have an excellent control variable
in the design engineer's estimate. For these reasons, we may be relatively condent of our
estimate of the cost increase and welfare gain.
4.4 Comparing Ex-Post Performance
Until now, we have assumed that A+B and standard contracts perform similarly after the
contract is signed. But one might be concerned that contractors are less likely to meet
their obligations in A+B contracts, for example by shirking on quality, completing late, or
by convincing project engineers to award them unnecessary extra weather days. Table 7
summarizes the ex-post performance of treatment and control contracts. A+B contracts
are typically shorter in duration (because days are bid down), nish in about the time bid,
get slightly more weather days, CCO days and other days, nish late slightly more often,
and get slightly higher deductions. Deductions are charged whenever there is some form of
contract violation, such as late completion or failure to meet specications. They thus shed
some light on the question of whether contractors are more likely to violate contract terms
on A+B contracts by performing sub-standard work, or hiring illegal labor etc.28
28This approach was also taken in Fick et al. (2010), where they looked at a sample of 455 standard and
22 contracts with time incentives from a particular state highway agency in 2007, and compared quality
deductions and quality adjustments. They found no statistically signicant dierences.
18Are any of these dierences signicant after conditioning on observables? To test this, we
regress the various outcome measures on covariates and A+B status for the set of treatment
and control contracts. The results in Table 8 show that A+B contracts actually take fewer
working days, weather days and total days conditional on observables, though not signi-
cantly so. And though deductions are higher, this too is not signicant, nor is the estimated
coecient particularly large relative to the average contract size. The data is therefore
consistent with the hypothesis that A+B and standard contracts have comparable ex-post
performance. This is not surprising: once the contract days have been specied (either by
bidding or by the design engineer), the contracts themselves are virtually identical.29 The
only substantive dierence is that the daily penalty for being late is typically higher in A+B
contracts (average of approximately $12K per day vs $7K for standard). This higher penalty
seems to be sucient to enforce compliance with the accelerated construction schedule.
5 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
Our analysis thus far suggests that the A+B contract design, as used by Caltrans, has worked
well. We now want to examine the trickier question of whether they could do better. To do
this, we will need to make some parametric assumptions and estimate a particular structural
model. The payo is that we will be able to examine counterfactual scenarios. In particular,
we will compare the outcomes from the observed policy with two policies based on using the
A+B design on all contracts (the \tax" approach), and two policies based on eliminating the
A+B program and instead just reducing the engineer's days (the \quota" approach). Our
approach will be to focus on modeling the bidding behavior of contractors, since we have
seen that ex-post, contractors complete almost exactly in the time they committed to. In
what follows we will assume on-time completion.
We systematically proceed through the auction process. First, we estimate a simple entry
model in which contractors decide which auctions to participate in on the basis of both
their own and the auction characteristics. Next, we model days bids in the A+B auctions,
specifying a parametric form for the contractor's acceleration costs and then exploiting a rst
order condition from the theory to estimate this curve. Last, we estimate the probability
29In a standard contract, the relevant clause in the special provisions is that \the work shall be diligently
prosecuted to completion before the expiration of X days"; whereas the A+B contract demands \diligent
completion before the expiration of the number of working days bid."
19of winning the auction conditional on bidder characteristics, residuals from the previous
regressions and (in the case of A+B auctions) the B-part of their score. By proceeding
in this way, we avoid the selection problems that would result if we only modeled part of
the process. Last, we simulate counterfactual outcomes for the observed set of rms and
contracts under alternate policies.
5.1 Entry
We use a simple static logit model of entry to simulate the set of bidders who will enter
each auction. We dierentiate rms on three dimensions: their distance from the contract
site, their size, and whether they are in-state or out-of-state. To dene rm size, we rst
compute the total volume of contracts held by the rm over the sample period. We then
form a coarse binary measure, \Big Firm", by classifying rms that held over $50M worth
of work as big. There are 21 such rms, which together account for around 25% of the total
volume. We treat the bidder and auction characteristics as exogenous throughout, although
in several of the specications we compare A+B with contracts in the control group (rather
than the full sample) to limit concerns of selection bias.
The results are shown in Table 9. Columns (1)-(4) are for only A+B and control group
contracts, while column (5) is for the full sample. In all specications, contract size and
distance enter negatively and highly signicantly, while big rm and engineer's days enter
positively. Fewer rms participate on bigger contracts, although the interaction between big
rm and size is positive. This presumably reects dierential capacity constraints. Firms
farther away from the site are also less likely to enter. Big rms participate in more auctions.
There seems to be little evidence that A+B contracts attract more or less participation
relative to the control group, with no joint signicance in the A+B coecients in columns
(2)-(4). This is the case when we interact the A+B dummy with big rm, distance and in-
state in column (3), implying that A+B contracts do not attract relatively more big rms,
or closer rms, conditional on the other observables. When we include rm xed eects
to control for rm-specic unobservables, the signicance of the A+B coecients is even
smaller. The broad picture that emerges is that matching is essentially based on distance
and size, rather than A+B status, and for that reason we use the full sample coecients
in column (5) for the rest of the structural estimation. Of course this does not rule out
matching on time-varying unobservables, such as a situation in which rms with excess
20capacity (unobserved) are dierentially more likely to participate in A+B auctions. We will
try to control for this potential selection eect in later regressions, by including the residuals
from the regression in (5) as controls.
5.2 Estimating Acceleration Costs
Next, we use the bidding behavior of contractors in A+B auctions to back out acceleration
costs. Recall the contractor's cost curve is c(d;). Dene the number of days accelerated as
e d = dB   dE, and the base cost  c(
M)  c(dE;
M) as the cost of completing the project on
the design engineer's schedule, where 
M is the part of the type that determines materials
and other base costs. Letting 
T be the part of the type determining acceleration costs, we
dene cA(e d;
T)  c(dE   e d;)  c(
M) as the cost of completing the project at a faster rate.
This cost curve is latent. But in an A+B contract, the theory tells us that the contractor
will bid to equate the marginal cost of acceleration with the usercost. Let bidders be indexed
by i, let contracts be indexed by j and let xij be a vector of bidder and contract covariates.










where j is a contract-specic unobservable. This specication is simple but exible. It
allows for linear marginal costs as a special case ( = 1) but admits both concave and
convex marginal costs. It also implies total acceleration costs of 1
1+cU;jf dij, which have the
attractive property that they are equal to zero if f dij = 0 (no acceleration). Taking logs and
re-arranging terms, we obtain our main estimating equation:









We will estimate this by OLS.
Identication: Before estimation it is useful to think through the identication of the
model. The argument is sketched in Figure 3. To start, suppose that there were no type
variation at all, so that there was a single marginal cost of acceleration c0
A(e d) to identify.
Then since contractors equate their marginal costs with the usercost, variation in usercosts
would induce contractors to bid dierent days. By matching the usercost with the days bid,























Figure 3: Identication. The left panel shows the identication argument for a xed type.
Exogenous variation in the usercosts from C1 to C3 causes the rm to bid dierent days, dB
1 to dB
3 .
The marked points can be plotted, and with sucient variation, the entire marginal acceleration
cost curve can be traced out. In the right panel, we show how dierences in the days bid for a xed
usercost allows us to measure how much heterogeneity there is across rms.
Now, let us allow for heterogeneity in types. In this case, for any given usercost we observe a
distribution of days bid, as in the right panel of the Figure. The variance of this distribution
is informative as to the degree of heterogeneity. We make two assumptions: rst, that
marginal costs are everywhere increasing in type, and second that type and usercost are
independent of each other. The rst condition is purely technical and rules out multiple
intersections between the marginal cost curves of dierent types (they all intersect once at
dE). The second is important, and we return to it below. Then to get the marginal cost curve
for the -th quantile of the type distribution, we proceed analogously to before: matching
usercosts with the -th quantile of days bid. All in all, the cost curve is non-parametrically
identied over the support of the usercost distribution. As is usual, this argument extends
to the case of non-identical contracts and covariates by conditioning.
The key non-parametric identication assumption is that the types and usercosts are inde-
pendent. Returning to our linear estimating equation, the practical analogue is that the
error j + ij must be uncorrelated with the log usercost and other regressors x. This gives
rise to two important endogeneity concerns: that Caltrans sets the usercost based on some
contract-level unobservable j that is also correlated with contractor costs (endogenous pol-
icy), and that the set of types ij that participate depends on the usercost (endogenous
entry). As we have already seen, there does not appear to be any average dierence in
entry behavior across standard and A+B contracts, which limits fears of endogenous entry.
Nonetheless, we will employ a control function approach to address this concern.
22The endogenous policy concern is harder to evaluate. From the regressions in Table 3, we
are fairly condent that District 4 sets its usercosts based on the liquidated damage formula
used statewide. From the formula in equation (1), we see that conditional on the type and
size of contract, the liquidated damages co-vary with the design engineer's estimate of home
oce expenses, which are likely orthogonal to the contractor's acceleration costs (especially
since it is the project engineer who will supervise the work). But although this is plausibly
exogenous variation, it is not good variation, since these oce expenses are a small part of
the liquidated damages.
Our best source of variation is inter-district variation, coming from the dierences in policy
for setting usercost in district 4 versus in other districts. From Table 3, we know that
usercosts are set considerably lower in district 4, conditional on the observables. So we can
identify the elasticity of days bid with respect to usercost by comparing the days bid on
similar contracts in district 4 versus other districts, accounting for any mean dierences in
acceleration costs with district xed eects. This does not eliminate endogeneity concerns,
of course. Although we have a good idea of how usercosts are computed in other districts
from having seen the relevant spreadsheets for some contracts | they are based on estimates
of social costs derived from the construction plans, detailed trac patterns and lane closures
| we cannot be sure that none of the elements entering these calculations is correlated
with acceleration costs. But since acceleration costs are basically a function of contractor
expertise and available capacity, it seems reasonable to believe that they are orthogonal to
social costs, and therefore to the usercosts in the other districts.
Estimation Results: The results of the regressions are reported in Table 10. In the rst
column we include neither xed eects nor any rm characteristics, and nd a non-signicant
eect of usercost on days bid. As we proceed through the regressions, successively adding
controls for rm characteristics and xed eects, this coecient grows to approximately
0.35 in columns (3) and (4) and becomes statistically signicant. In column (4), we have
included an entry residual from the participation model in column 5 of Table 9, dened as
(1   b p), where b p is the predicted probability of entry. This does not enter signicantly, and
has minimal impact on the estimated coecient on log usercost, which suggests that the
endogenous entry concern is not important here.30
The other coecients have the expected signs. Contract size is signicant in every specica-
30We have experimented with a more exible control function, implemented as a piecewise linear spline
with knots at the quartiles, but the coecients are not jointly coecient (p-value 0.7107).
23tion, with longer contracts attracting more acceleration and higher estimated costs contracts
getting less. This is consistent with a scenario in which contractors are constrained in how
much work they can do per day, and so when there's more work per day (higher cost or
fewer days) they oer to accelerate less. Big rms and rms closer to the contract site oer
speedier construction, as one would expect. Finally, rms oer more acceleration when they
are less constrained by lane closure requirements (higher lane closure ratio), and when they
don't face explicit penalties for re-opening a lane late on any construction day.
Our preferred specication is column (3), with an estimated coecient on log usercost of
0:348. From equation (7) this coecient has a structural interpretation as 1=, implying 
roughly equal to 3, and thus sharply convex marginal costs of acceleration. This is consistent
with what we know about the construction process: small reductions in time can be achieved
at the same scale by cutting out contingency time, but larger reductions require genuine
acceleration and operation at an inecient scale.
The Type Distribution: So far, we have been able to remain agnostic as to the distribu-
tions of j and ij. But for simulation purposes, we need to be able to draw contract shocks
and individual-specic types. This requires deconvolution of the error term j + ij. Given
our limited data, it does not make sense to take the fully non-parametric approach of Li and
Vuong (1998). Instead, we assume that both j and ij are normally distributed, iid across
contracts and bidders, and independent of each other, with j  N(0;2
) and ij  N(0;2
).
The deconvolution process is relatively straightforward: we estimate 2
 from the variance
of dierences in residuals within contracts, and then back out 2
 as the dierence between
the overall variance in residuals and our estimate of 2
. We estimate 2
 = 0:13, implying a
standard deviation of 36% in the costs of acceleration across contracts. Bidder heterogeneity
accounts for much more of the variance, with 2
 estimated as 0:23, and thus a standard
deviation of nearly 50% across bidders for the same contract.
The normal-normal model ts the observed density fairly well, as we will see when we
simulate moments from the full structural model.31 The independence assumptions are
obviously strong, though necessary. In particular, the iid assumption across periods for ij
implies no persistence in a given rm's type across contracts. Our bidder observables |
big rm, in-state rm and log distance | will allow for some persistence, but ultimately
there's no denying the fact that this is not a dynamic model. We return to this point in the
discussion of the counterfactual results.
31We have also tried conditional deconvolution, 2
 = 2
(xj), but this doesn't appear to aid model t.
245.3 Who wins the auction?
Last, we need a model of who wins the auction conditional on bidder covariates and type,
days bid and the weight given to time in the scoring rule. We want to avoid modeling the full
auction, because doing this convincingly would take us far aeld. Recall that in a scoring
auction, bidders compete on the basis of pseudo-costs, and if bidders are symmetric, the
bidder with a lowest pseudo-cost wins. Writing the pseudo-cost out in a way that separates





ij;j;xij) +  c(
M



















all contract-level terms including 1
1+cU;jdE
j into a xed eect j. This index form motivates
a conditional logit model for the probability of winning, where contract xed eects capture
the term j, and cU;j is set to zero in standard contracts.
There are a few problems with this. First, since bidders are asymmetric, it may not be the
case that the bidder with the lowest pseudo-cost wins | but this is a reasonable approxima-
tion to the truth. Second, the distribution of 
M
ij almost certainly exhibits heteroskedasticity,
with bigger contracts having more variation in base costs across bidders. To deal with this,
we normalize the B-score cUdB
ij by the engineer's cost estimate. Finally, the base type 
M
ij
may be correlated with either the days bid dB (through correlation with 
T
ij) or the covariates
xij. To address this, we include residuals from both the bidding and entry models as controls
in the conditional logit.32
The results are shown in the rst column of Table 11. The rst column includes only our
bidder observables, and shows that big rms, in-state rms and closer rms are more likely
to win, though only signicantly so for big rms. In the second column, we include the
normalized B-score as a control, and this enters highly signicantly and negatively. This is
unsurprising since we know that lower scores win the auction. The most interesting results are
in the third column. Both residuals enter signicantly as controls. The negative coecient
on the entry residual | signicant at 10% | implies that rms that were predicted to be
unlikely entrants (i.e. high residual) are unlikely to be winners at the end of the day. More
32Since the days bid regression was estimated using the subsample of A+B contracts, we have no bid
residuals for standard contracts, and normalize it to zero.
25important for us, the positive coecient on the bid residual implies a positive correlation
between base and acceleration costs. This may be because there is some xed input that
drives both, like managerial capacity. Had we omitted this control, we would have incorrectly
concluded that the positive selection of bidders with low acceleration costs was entirely due
to the A+B mechanism, rather than it being a combination of the mechanism and this
underlying correlation (see the coecients on normalized B-score in columns (2) and (3)).
From a big picture perspective, positive selection makes A+B auctions more attractive. One
might have thought that there was a sharp trade-o between fast and cheap contract comple-
tion, with some rms specializing in fast completion and others in cheap completion. In that
case the use of A+B contracts would sharply raise base costs relative to the standard design,
by favoring the fast but expensive contractors, and dealing with the commuter externality
may not actually yield much of a welfare gain. What we have learned from these regressions
is that it is the same kinds of rms that participate in both kinds of contract | contrary to
a specialization story | and that \fast" and \cheap" are positively correlated. This is good
for social welfare. A downside of this is that the best rms | those with spare capacity, say
| have increasing market power as the usercost increases, and their markups should reect
this. So while using A+B contracts appears to be particularly good for total welfare given
our observations thus far, it may raise procurement costs substantially.
5.4 Counterfactuals
We are now able to model counterfactual changes and simulate their outcomes using our
dataset. The important maintained assumption is that the distribution of types and contract
shocks estimated above remains constant as we change policies. This requires our earlier
assumption of random A+B assignment conditional on the observables, since otherwise we
cannot expect the distribution of j for standard contracts to be the same as we estimated
for A+B contracts. We are also assuming random entry conditional on the observables.
We consider four policies. The rst two are A+B policies. In the rst, the usercost is
set equal to the estimated social cost (the ecient policy) and all contracts are assigned
A+B status.33 In the second, the usercost is assigned to be only 10% of the estimated
social cost (the \budget" policy). Policies of this type | where the usercosts are a constant
33We are poorly identied outside of the support of the usercosts. So we bound the usercost above at the
engineer's estimate / engineer's days, so the B-score can be no bigger than the engineer's estimate.
26fraction of the social cost | are constrained ecient when the constraint bounds the total
increase in contractor acceleration costs over all contracts. This second policy is motivated
by the observation that since acceleration costs are so convex, Caltrans can get more \bang
for buck" without increasing overall contractor costs | and therefore hopefully without
increasing Caltrans costs | by using A+B contracts frequently but with small incentives.34
The last two policies are \quota" policies, where Caltrans elects to reduce the engineer's days
by 10% uniformly to accelerate contract completion, rather than using the A+B design. The
theory suggests this should be inecient and perform worse, but this policy is much simpler
and so it is interesting to know how much worse it would do.35 We consider a \hard" quota,
where the penalty for violating it is essentially innite, and so contractors will certainly
complete on time; and a \soft" quota, where the current liquidated damages rates continue
to apply for being late.
The simulation procedure is as follows. Fix a policy. Then for each contract, randomly
draw a set of participants using the estimated logit model, and independently draw contract
shocks j and types ij for each participant from the estimated normal distributions.36 Then
using the bidding model, determine the level of acceleration that equates marginal benets
and costs for each participant, and work out the associated total acceleration costs.37 Fi-
nally, work out the win probability for each contractor using the conditional logit model,
and average across participants to get expected acceleration and costs.38 We repeat this
simulation process 1000 times, and report the average outcomes across all simulations.39 To
get condence intervals for the outcomes, we estimate the bidding, type distributions and
win probability regressions exactly as before using a sequence of 100 bootstrap samples and
then run the simulation as before using the bootstrapped coecients.40 We choose not to
34The \small incentives" approach is also attractive because it leaves less room for a rm with an advantage
on both base and acceleration costs to exert market power.
35We thank Justin Marion for making this suggestion.
36Whenever the entry model randomly draws zero entrants, we force the draw of a single bidder, where
each rm has chance proportional to their probability of participation.
37We constrain the days bid to be no less than 20% of the engineer's days | essentially assuming innite
marginal costs at that point | since we never observe bids below this threshold in the data.
38In quota contracts, we must account for dierences in acceleration costs across bidders when calculating
win probabilities. From equation (8) our estimated coecient on the normalized B-score in the conditional
logit on winning has a structural interpretation as 
1+the coecient on the sum of the normalized B-score
and acceleration costs. We therefore inate the estimated reduced-form coecient by 1+
 and multiply the
result by the acceleration cost, including this term in the index used to calculate win probabilities.
39We have experimented with more or less repetitions, but there is little simulation error at this size.
40We discard bootstrap samples where the coecient on log usercost is negative, as the simulation results
become meaningless. This occurs in approximately 4% of cases.
27bootstrap the participation model since it is quite precisely estimated o a very large sample
and estimation is computationally demanding. The bootstrap samples are clustered by con-
tract and stratied by year, so that the xed eects are estimable in all samples. We report
95% condence intervals from the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the bootstrap simulations.
Model Fit: A number of sample moments and their simulated counterparts are shown in
Table 12. Fitting these moments is a fairly strong test of the structural model as a whole,
since our estimation approach was to sequentially estimate a series of individual models for
entry, bidding and winning, rather than simultaneously matching all the moments as in a
simulated GMM procedure. The advantage is that the estimation procedure is considerably
more transparent, but specication errors at each step may accumulate.
Consider the rst two columns, which compare a set of important sample and simulated
moments under the observed A+B assignment. The participation model ts well, although it
slightly over-predicts the distance of participating bidders, and under-predicts the fraction of
big rms on contracts over $10M. Moving to the bidding model, the estimated acceleration is
within the 95% condence interval for all moments, and extremely close for the key statistic,
the mean acceleration of winning bidders. Finally, the win probability model also does pretty
well, matching the probability of winning conditional on having the lowest score fairly closely,
although doing a worse job on the win probability in contracts with large B-components.
Overall the t is good, especially since virtually none of these moments was being directly
matched during the estimation procedure.
Results: Turning now to the counterfactual A+B policies in columns (3) and (4), we see
that average contract acceleration is lower than in the data. This is essentially because of
selection: the Caltrans policy assigned A+B status to big contracts, and in the counterfactual
policies A+B status is also assigned to small contracts, so mean acceleration falls. Comparing
the optimal and budget policies, we see that although the usercosts in the optimal policy are
on average over 5 times bigger, there is less than twice the acceleration, due to the convexity
of the acceleration curve.41 The hard quota policy achieves exactly 10% acceleration, as
one would expect, but the soft quota does slightly worse because it doesn't always bind. In
addition to promoting more acceleration from all bidders, the time incentives also induce
positive selection in that the winning bidder is more likely to be the contractor oering to
do the project fastest | 65% of the time under the optimal policy.
41The usercosts are not ten times bigger because of the cap we enforce on the size of the usercosts.
28Table 13 compares the simulated results in welfare terms. The optimal policy would reduce
completion time to 64% of the engineer's estimate, the budget policy would still achieve 76%
completion time, while the hard quota would get 90% (by design) and the soft quota would
get 90.4%. Under the existing policy, commuters gain nearly $5M per contract. Gains in
the counterfactual policies are smaller from $2.5M for the optimal policy through to $0.5M
for the quota policies, once again because these policies are not selective. Acceleration costs
vary sharply across policies. The optimal policy is expensive, at $372K a contract (due to
the big incentives). By contrast, the budget policy with its small incentives, induces quite
good acceleration at an average cost of only $44000 per contract. The hard and soft quotas
are even cheaper, at $10000 and $5000 a contract. The big relative dierence in the quota
acceleration costs arises from the rare occasions when all the participants have high type
and would prefer to nish on time, but the hard quota forces the winner to nish fast.42
Moving onto the totals, the bottom line is that the counterfactual A+B policies perform
substantially better. In particular, the \budget" policy raises commuter welfare relative to
contractor costs by $1.2B (compared with the current policy at $359M) over the sample
period, while reducing the total acceleration costs of contractors. To put the magnitude of
these gains into perspective, the total value of these contracts (as assessed by the engineer's
estimate) is $5.24B, so the $1.2B gain from the budget policy is 23%. Interestingly, even the
soft quota performs better than the current policy. So if A+B assignment for all contracts
is not feasible for reasons not modeled here, a hybrid of more aggressive scheduling for most
contracts, along with A+B assignment for the most time sensitive might still be a substantial
improvement. Except in the case of the hard quota, the simulated outcomes are estimated
reasonably precisely, and the condence intervals rarely overlap.
Sensitivity Analysis: It would be reassuring if our results were not heavily dependent on
the details of our structural model. In Table 14 we show outcomes for the counterfactuals
under three alternate scenarios. The rst is that A+B assignment is restricted to the 161
size-eligible contracts. We consider this scenario to address the concern that we are using
the functional form of the structural model to make inferences for contracts for which we
have never observed A+B assignment. The broad welfare conclusion is similar: the A+B
policies perform better than the quotas. The hard quota now performs much better than the
soft quota, because the liquidated damage rates are insucient to deter late completion in
42With steeper cost curves, the hard quota sometimes induces very high costs. Accordingly, our boot-
strapped condence intervals are sometimes virtually unbounded, and we just put a "-" in the table to
indicate a very large number.
29big contracts. Notice also that for the optimal policies, the welfare gain is $500M less than
before. This implies that assigning A+B status to small contracts accounts for a substantial
share of the potential welfare gain.
In the second scenario we examine the sensitivity of the results to our social cost estimates.
Recall that although we had been quite conservative, our social costs were much higher than
the Caltrans usercosts. So here we divide them by three (making them roughly comparable
to Caltrans), and rerun the simulations. Obviously the welfare gains are much smaller (by
a factor of more than 3), but they are still substantive | $311M in the case of the budget
policy. Finally, in the last scenario we change , the parameter governing the shape of the
acceleration curve. To implement this, we rerun our bidding model under the constraint that
the coecient on log usercost is 0:175 (i.e. half of what it was estimated to be), and proceed
as before. This implies   5:7, a much steeper cost curve. To rationalize the observed data
with this new curve, marginal costs are very low at rst, though rising quicker than before.
The results of this experiment are interesting. The conclusions are if anything reinforced:
even if the cost curve is much steeper than we had estimated, both the ecient and welfare
policies still deliver welfare gains between $1.3B and $1.5B. But the case for the budget
policy becomes even stronger: total acceleration costs are now only $16M total, and the
welfare gain is higher than before. The hard quota now performs far worse than the other
policies, which suggests it is not a particularly robust policy choice. Overall, across all of
these scenarios, the welfare gain from the budget policy at least $311M, which is still large
relative to the total size of the contracts (5.9%).
Discussion: Strong time incentives will lead contractors to accelerate, and their increased
costs will be passed through to Caltrans. In fact, while we estimate that the acceleration
cost for the A+B contracts is approximately $474,000 per contract, in the reduced form
analysis we estimated an increase in the winning bid of around $1.5M. As we argued earlier,
the positive correlation between base and acceleration costs we saw in the data can generate
large markups. Risk aversion may also explain why there is such a gap between acceleration
costs and the bids. This raises the issue of how costly this policy will be to Caltrans: if
costs are passed through to bids with this kind of multiplier, it may create budget problems.
It is this concern that motivates the \budget" policy, where small time incentives are used.
Instead of modeling the pass-through rate explicitly, we show that the budget policy incurs
lower acceleration costs than the current A+B policy, and so for any constant pass-through
rate, this policy will be cheaper. This makes it a pragmatic policy choice.
30Our analysis ignores dynamics and general equilibrium eects. In terms of dynamics, if
types were perfectly persistent and capacity constrained, then an expansion of the A+B
program might fare worse than we project, as the best types would be unable to participate
on all of these contracts. But it seems plausible that type is determined by something like
capacity, which evolves, so as some rms become busy, others will be able to step in. The
general equilibrium concern is that accelerating all contracts would cause input prices to
rise. This is not necessarily right: if overall demand for highway construction contracts
remains constant, long-run input demand will also stay constant. The question is whether
contractors operating at bigger scale over shorter periods of time will lead to bottlenecks in
input supply, and this seems far from clear. Given the large and robust benets to providing
even small time incentives, it certainly seems worth trying.
6 Conclusion
The A+B program appears to be a policy success, with the gains to commuters substantially
higher than the costs to Caltrans. Yet our analysis shows that there are still substantial inef-
ciencies. Expanding the use of the A+B contract design and tightening time requirements
on standard contracts would signicantly increase commuter welfare relative to contractor
costs. The current policies reserve the A+B design for big contracts, and assign commen-
surately big time incentives. But as we have shown, this sacrices about a third of the
potential welfare gain (by ruling out small contracts) and is costly because of the convex
acceleration costs. Small across-the-board time incentives may increase commuter welfare
relative to contractor costs, while still lowering procurement costs.
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33Table 1: Summary Statistics
Standard A+B Standard A+B
(sample districts) (other districts)
Engineer's Estimate ($M) 5.282 22.31 4.203 22.88
(16.46) (25.84) (12.27) (23.98)
Winning Bid ($M) 4.656 21.37 3.866 17.11
(15.43) (31.18) (11.21) (14.99)
Winning Bid / Engineer's Estimate 0.906 0.925 0.903 0.842
(0.257) (0.217) (0.222) (0.142)
Number of Bidders 4.949 5.405 4.687 4
(2.573) (2.594) (2.527) (2.191)
Engineer's Days Estimate 125.3 321.6 117.9 223.3
(191.5) (215.9) (158.8) (77.11)
Trac 76208.3 120324.6 33426.4 84354.2
(84053.6) (72717.5) (51914.0) (111990.9)
Lane Closure Ratio 0.467 0.433 0.490 0.444
(0.116) (0.0950) (0.111) (0.0742)
Reopening Penalty 0.418 0.835 0.214 0.667
Estimated daily welfare loss 33977.8 51130.9 15258.0 53835.1
(46946.3) (45913.6) (28903.3) (76767.1)
Usercost (if A+B) 15242 27189.7
(13889.6) (12762.7)
N 603 79 689 6
Summary statistics for the full dataset, split into four groups. Sample districts are 4 (SF Bay), 6 (Fresno),
8 (Riverside/San Bernardino), 11 (San Diego) & 12 (Orange County). The other seven districts assign few
A+B contracts and are not included in the subsequent analysis. SE for binary variables are not reported.
34Table 2: Probability of A+B Assignment
A+B Assignment
District 4 Other Districts All
Engineer's Estimate ($M) 0.0089*** -0.0017 0.0016
(0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0015)
Engineer's Days Estimate -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Trac (thousands) 0.0017** 0.0009* 0.0014***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004)




N 84 92 176
% Correctly Predicted (eligible only) 65.88 71.28 71.51
% Correctly Predicted (all) 82.61 94.38 91.94
Coecients are average marginal eects from a probit of AB assignment on the covariates using the sample of
eligible contracts only. \Eligible Contracts" refers to contracts with engineer's days > 100 in District 4, and
engineers estimate > $5M plus usercost > $5K elsewhere. Reported standard errors are robust. Signicance
is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The % correctly predicted is the fraction of
A+B assignment decisions predicted by a rule that only assigns AB status to eligible contracts with b p > 0:5.
Table 3: Usercost Regressions
Log Usercost
District 4 Other Districts All
Log Engineer's Estimate 0.898*** 0.468** 0.759***
(0.063) (0.167) (0.082)
Log Engineer's Days -0.895*** 0.021 -0.637***
(0.095) (0.219) (0.120)
Log Trac 0.005 0.011 0.023
(0.051) (0.052) (0.045)
Plant Establishment 0.375** 0.256 0.256**
(0.168) (0.200) (0.125)




N 51 27 78
R2 0.80 0.42 0.71
Robust standard errors reported. Signicance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
35Table 4: Summary Statistics: Treatment and Control Groups
Standard (Control) A+B (Treatment) Dierence
Engineer's Estimate ($M) 19.03 19.22 -0.19
Winning Bid ($M) 16.30 17.33 -1.04
Winning Bid / Engineer's Estimate 0.87 0.92 -0.05
Number of Bidders 5.96 5.56 0.40
Engineer's Days Estimate 361.93 315.63 46.30
Trac 92821.25 122398.36 -29577.11**
Lane Closure Ratio 0.47 0.42 0.05***
Reopening Penalty 0.52 0.83 -0.32***
Estimated daily welfare loss 43373.70 52903.67 -9529.97
Types of Work
Bridge Repairs 0.11 0.08 0.03
Construction 0.13 0.15 -0.03
Rehabilitation 0.39 0.41 -0.02
Widen and Realign 0.27 0.27 0.00
N 95 66 161
Summary statistics for a subsample of contracts. The treatment group is a subset of all A+B contracts, excluding
contracts over $90M, bridge resurfacing contracts, and contracts that would not ordinarily be eligible for A+B
assignment. The control group is the corresponding subset of eligible standard contracts. A t-test for dierences
in means is conducted for each variable, and the outcome is reported in the third column. Signicance is denoted
by asterisks: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
36Table 5: Policy Evaluation: OLS
Log Winning Bid
(1) (2) (3)
A+B 0.074** 0.106*** 0.107***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038)
Log Engineer's Estimate 0.944*** 0.941*** 0.940***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)








District/Year/Work Type FE No Yes Yes
R2 0.9534 0.9714 0.9718
N 161 161 161
Coecients are from OLS regression of winning bid on covariates. District, year and type of work xed eects
are included where indicated. Reported standard errors are robust. Signicance is denoted by asterisks: *
p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Table 6: Policy Evaluation
OLS Nearest Neighbor
 Avg. Winning Bid ($M) 1.230** 1.743*** 1.767*** 1.626* 2.135**
(0.597) (0.558) (0.587) (0.986) (0.969)
 Avg. Commuter Welfare ($M) 6.981 6.981 6.981 6.981 6.981
 (C. Welfare - WinBid) ($M) 5.751 5.238 5.215 5.355 4.847
The average treatment on the treated (ATT) is estimated. The rst three columns correspond to the OLS
regression above, with robust standard errors calculated via the delta method. The last two columns are the
ATT estimated via nearest neighbor matching, with exact matching on district, year and type of work, and
bias correction using the variables in OLS regressions (2) and (3) respectively. Exactly one match is used.
Exact matches are achieved in 66% of cases. Signicance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01.
37Table 7: Summary Statistics: Ex-Post Data
Standard A+B
Contract days 193.9 157.6
(177.0) (106.1)
Working days used 177.9 157.9
(144.3) (108.2)
Weather days 69.21 73.50
(55.74) (71.41)
Contract change order days 15.30 19.23
(26.82) (25.86)
Other days 7.170 11.15
(25.47) (22.60)
Fraction Late 0 0.0250





Ex-post summary statistics for a subsample of contracts. The A+B (treatment) group is a subset of all
A+B contracts, excluding contracts over $90M, bridge resurfacing contracts, and contracts that would not
ordinarily be eligible for A+B assignment. The standard (control) group is the corresponding subset of
eligible standard contracts. SE for binary variables are not reported.
38Table 8: Ex-post analysis
Working Weather Other Total Deductions
Days Days Days Days
A+B -8.942 -21.424 6.689 -23.677 19258.663
(8.865) (19.677) (6.589) (23.185) (21716.804)
Contract days 0.782*** -0.006 -0.021 0.754*** -112.945
(0.077) (0.079) (0.032) (0.120) (113.203)
Engineer's Estimate ($M) 1.448** 1.015 0.033 2.497** 3099.237
(0.676) (1.113) (0.288) (0.976) (2479.001)
Trac (thousands) 0.113 -0.087 0.108* 0.134 -322.334
(0.073) (0.135) (0.061) (0.151) (247.879)
Lane Closure Ratio -42.136 -144.448** 46.664 -139.920 -2.21e+04
(35.718) (58.724) (44.223) (93.651) (98615.740)
Reopening Penalty -9.177 38.053* -15.711 13.165 6566.810
(10.359) (19.845) (9.738) (24.720) (22013.903)
District/Year/Work Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9669 0.2958 0.3602 0.8264 0.2608
N 87 87 87 87 87
Coecients from OLS regressions of ex-post outcomes on covariates. District, year and type of work xed
eects are included. Reported standard errors are robust. Asterisks denote signicance levels: * p < 0:1, **
p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
39Table 9: Participation
Dummy for Participation
A+B Eligible Contracts All Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Distance (miles) -0.930*** -0.930*** -0.922*** -1.162*** -0.884***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.048) (0.095) (0.018)
Big Firm  Engest ($M) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Big Firm  Federal Contract 0.382* 0.383* 0.340 0.383** 0.364***
(0.217) (0.216) (0.217) (0.191) (0.107)
Instate Contractor -0.807*** -0.808*** -0.858*** -1.098***
(0.236) (0.236) (0.277) (0.111)
Big Firm 1.108*** 1.108*** 0.999*** 1.246***
(0.214) (0.214) (0.222) (0.064)
Federal Contract -0.213 -0.190 -0.173 -0.185 0.015
(0.140) (0.142) (0.143) (0.152) (0.057)
Engineer's Estimate ($M) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Engineer's Days Estimate 0.001** 0.000* 0.000* 0.001 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Trac -0.186*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.208*** -0.068***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) (0.017)
Has PE work -0.037 -0.003 0.003 0.041 0.019
(0.170) (0.173) (0.175) (0.223) (0.124)
A+B Contract -0.099 -0.339 -0.483
(0.093) (0.628) (0.644)
A+B  Big Firm 0.334* 0.160
(0.181) (0.192)
A+B  Log Distance -0.018 0.010
(0.066) (0.069)
A+B  Instate 0.167 0.236
(0.517) (0.487)
District/Year/Work Type FE yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE no no no yes no
N 18396 18396 18396 18396 194060
Wald test of A+B coefs (p-value) - 0.291 0.213 0.663 -
Raw coecients from logistic regressions of participation on covariates. A data point is a bidder-contract pair.
Columns (1)-(4) are estimated only on contracts that are typically eligible for A+B assignment; column (5) is
estimated using all contracts. District, year and type of work xed eects are included; and rm xed eects
are included in column (4). Standard errors are robust and clustered by contract. Asterisks denote signicance
levels: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The p-value reported in the last row is from a Wald test of the joint
signicance of the A+B coecients.
40Table 10: Incentives and Acceleration in A+B contracts
Log days accelerated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Usercost 0.167 0.229* 0.348** 0.350**
(0.112) (0.120) (0.139) (0.138)
Log Engineer's Days Estimate 1.269*** 1.349*** 1.604*** 1.610***
(0.178) (0.182) (0.201) (0.201)
Log Engineer's Estimate -0.200 -0.278** -0.430*** -0.429***
(0.133) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138)
Log Trac 0.026 0.010 -0.064 -0.064
(0.073) (0.077) (0.064) (0.064)
Has PE work -0.353 -0.368 -0.261 -0.263
(0.227) (0.233) (0.212) (0.212)
Lane Closure Ratio 0.912 0.986 0.687 0.703
(0.783) (0.789) (0.673) (0.665)
Reopening Penalty -0.066 -0.075 -0.297* -0.300*
(0.190) (0.191) (0.173) (0.171)
Big Firm 0.238** 0.257** 0.297*
(0.103) (0.103) (0.156)
Instate Contractor -0.172 -0.324 -0.343
(0.233) (0.231) (0.241)




District/Year/Work Type FE no no yes yes
R2 0.310 0.322 0.396 0.396
N 421 421 421 421
OLS Regressions of log days accelerated on covariates, where days accelerated is engineer's days less days bid.
\Entry Residual" is the residual from the participation regression of column (5) of Table 9. District, year and
type of work xed eects are included where indicated. Standard errors are robust and clustered by contract.
Asterisks denote signicance levels: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
41Table 11: Winning and Time Incentives
Probability of Winning
Big Firm 0.100*** 0.080*** 0.042
(0.029) (0.027) (0.036)
Instate Contractor 0.046 0.056 0.062
(0.075) (0.069) (0.065)
Log Distance (miles) -0.019 -0.014 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)






Contract FE yes yes yes
N 2871 2871 2871
Average marginal eects are reported from a conditional logistic regression of the probability of winning
on covariates. \B-score" is dened as days bid times usercost, equal to zero for standard contracts. \Bid
residual" is the residual from the regression in column (3) of Table 10 above, and is included as a control
function (equal to zero for standard contracts). \Entry Residual" is the residual from the participation
regression of column (5) of Table 9. Contract FE are included and the model is estimated as a conditional
logit. Standard errors are robust and clustered by contract. Signicance levels are denoted by asterisks: *
p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
42Table 12: Sample and Simulated Moments
Data Current Ecient Policy Budget 10% Quota 10% Quota
Policy (100% Welfare) (10% Welfare) (hard) (soft)
# AB Contracts 78.00 78.00 620.00 620.00 0
Avg. Usercost 14.80 14.80 15.66 2.97 - -
# Bidders 4.79 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.82
# Bidders if AB 5.40 5.31 4.82 4.82 - -
Avg. bidder distance 104.10 123.08 123.08 123.08 123.08 123.08
Fraction big rms 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Fraction big rms if > $10M 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Engdays - days bid 101.46 98.50 54.20 32.36 14.15 13.60
(if AB) - (90.03,108.20) (47.61,62.78) (21.26,52.43) (14.15,14.15) (11.99,13.89)
Engdays - days bid 56.78 49.86 27.79 17.81 7.33 7.02
(if AB & engdays <250) - (43.69,58.25) (21.16,34.76) (12.07,29.79) (7.33,7.33) (6.13,7.24)
Engdays - days bid 141.79 142.40 194.86 109.84 50.49 48.64
(if AB & engdays >250) - (126.59,159.52) (164.06,239.69) (69.49,174.00) (50.49,50.49) (43.43,49.67)
Engdays - win days bid 126.39 127.71 72.03 40.41 14.15 13.77
(if AB) - (112.75,141.73) (64.08,79.99) (27.27,62.92) (14.15,14.15) (12.43,14.01)
Engdays - win days bid 69.65 63.73 35.75 22.14 7.33 7.10
(if AB & engdays <250) - (54.28,74.51) (28.80,41.93) (15.43,35.55) (7.33,7.33) (6.32,7.27)
Engdays - win days bid 177.60 185.44 265.26 137.70 50.49 49.28
(if AB & engdays >250) - (159.58,211.21) (220.86,305.56) (88.11,211.26) (50.49,50.49) (44.78,49.96)
Pr(Win) if low B-score 0.49 0.52 0.65 0.49 - -
(if AB) - (0.46,0.60) (0.55,0.71) (0.45,0.57)
Pr(Win) if low B-score 0.51 0.58 0.72 0.66 - -
(if AB & b-score/engest>0.2) - (0.50,0.67) (0.59,0.80) (0.51,0.74)
Simulation results. The rst column is the observed data; the second column is simulated moments under the observed A+B
assignment; the third through sixth columns are counterfactuals. The third and fourth columns are policies of assigning all contracts
to be A+B, with usercost set either at the consumer welfare or some fraction of it. The fth and sixth columns show policies reducing
the number of engineer's days by 10% in all contracts, with an innite (\hard") penalty or a soft penalty equal to the liquidated
damages that would usually be assessed if late. 95% condence intervals are given in parentheses, and are generated by bootstrapping
the regressions in Tables 10 and 11, and taking the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the simulated results based on the bootstrapped
coecients. Condence intervals are not reported for participation moments, since the participation model was not bootstrapped.
43Table 13: Counterfactual Welfare
Current Ecient Policy Budget 10% Quota 10% Quota
Policy (100% Welfare) (10% Welfare) (hard) (soft)
B-Days/Engdays (%) 69.13 63.73 77.59 90.00 90.44
(66.16,71.60) (52.66,72.82) (59.87,85.59) (90.00,90.00) (90.11,91.71)
Mean Commuter Gain ($M) 5.08 2.82 1.98 0.63 0.61
(4.57,5.72) (2.35,3.39) (1.59,2.62) (0.63,0.63) (0.54,0.62)
Mean Acc. Cost($M) 0.474 0.372 0.044 0.011 0.005
(0.045,0.834) (0.033,0.636) (0.005,0.065) (0.007,0.054) (0.000,0.018)
Mean Net Gain ($M) 4.60 2.45 1.93 0.62 0.60
(3.93,5.36) (2.12,2.91) (1.54,2.58) (0.57,0.62) (0.52,0.62)
Total Acc. Cost ($M) 36.95 230.52 27.13 6.73 3.14
(3.52,65.07) (20.38,394.22) (2.91,40.32) (4.36,33.69) (0.16,11.37)
Total Net Gain ($M) 359.06 1518.15 1197.87 383.20 373.22
(306.33,417.80) (1317.33,1802.10) (954.15,1598.89) (356.23,385.56) (324.89,383.40)
Counterfactual welfare results under dierent policies. The rst column is simulated outcomes under the observed A+B policy,
averaged over A+B contracts. The second and third columns are policies of assigning all contracts to be A+B, with usercost set
either at the consumer welfare or some fraction of it. The fourth and fth columns show a \quota" policy of reducing the number of
engineer's days by 10% in all contracts, with an innite (\hard") penalty or a soft penalty equal to the liquidated damages that would
usually be assessed if late. 95% condence intervals are given in parentheses, and are generated by bootstrapping the regressions in
Tables 10 and 11, and taking the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the simulated results based on the bootstrapped coecients. For
the hard quota, these percentiles are sometimes unreasonably large: we put a "-" in those cases.
Table 14: Sensitivity Analysis
Current Ecient Policy Budget 10% Quota 10% Quota
Policy (100% Welfare) (10% Welfare) (hard) (soft)
Scenario 1 Total Cost ($M) 37.81 215.39 20.16 9.23 2.70
(eligible only) Total Welfare ($M) 358.21 970.11 705.05 380.69 255.40
Scenario 2 Total Cost ($M) 37.81 99.95 7.92 9.23 3.17
(social cost / 3) Total Welfare ($M) 94.20 411.10 311.29 120.74 122.28
Scenario 3 Total Cost ($M) 20.53 129.08 16.54 114.27 0.98
( 2) Total Welfare ($M) 376.61 1468.07 1308.95 275.65 380.33
Counterfactual welfare results under dierent policies and scenarios. The columns correspond to the policies in Table 13. The rst
scenario restricts A+B assignment to only size-eligible contracts. The second scenario redoes the calculations with social costs one
third of those we estimated. The nal scenario assumes  = 5:7, twice as big as estimated, implying a much steeper cost curve.
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